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	<title>Comments on: VOIP Security</title>
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	<link>http://dmiessler.com/blog/voip-security</link>
	<description>grepping intervals</description>
	<pubDate>Fri, 09 Jan 2009 21:58:34 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: SIPthat.com - Erik's daily musings on VoIP and IP Communications</title>
		<link>http://dmiessler.com/blog/voip-security/comment-page-1#comment-1224</link>
		<dc:creator>SIPthat.com - Erik's daily musings on VoIP and IP Communications</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Aug 2005 21:38:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dmiessler.com/archives/405#comment-1224</guid>
		<description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;VoIP Security Interview with Rohan Mahy&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Open Standards VoIP Security - On the Fast Track I had the opportunity to speak with Rohan Mahy yesterday and we had some great conversation about existing and new VoIP Security specifications proposed by the IETF. We talked about TLS,...&lt;/p&gt;
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>VoIP Security Interview with Rohan Mahy</strong></p>

<p>Open Standards VoIP Security - On the Fast Track I had the opportunity to speak with Rohan Mahy yesterday and we had some great conversation about existing and new VoIP Security specifications proposed by the IETF. We talked about TLS,&#8230;</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Daniel</title>
		<link>http://dmiessler.com/blog/voip-security/comment-page-1#comment-1181</link>
		<dc:creator>Daniel</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 Jul 2005 14:37:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dmiessler.com/archives/405#comment-1181</guid>
		<description>&lt;p&gt;Yes, I'm quite sure it's end-to-end. We do in fact create unique keys just for this purpose. Here, let me append the post with the encryption information.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;small&gt;(Check the post again)&lt;/small&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yes, I&#8217;m quite sure it&#8217;s end-to-end. We do in fact create unique keys just for this purpose. Here, let me append the post with the encryption information.</p>

<p><small>(Check the post again)</small></p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Jason Ormes</title>
		<link>http://dmiessler.com/blog/voip-security/comment-page-1#comment-1180</link>
		<dc:creator>Jason Ormes</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 Jul 2005 13:38:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dmiessler.com/archives/405#comment-1180</guid>
		<description>&lt;p&gt;are you sure its end to end.  we never create unique keys.  there could be an intermediary server that you and I are talking to that decripts and then reencrypts the traffic.  Unless you've seen something that points otherwise.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Jason&lt;/p&gt;
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>are you sure its end to end.  we never create unique keys.  there could be an intermediary server that you and I are talking to that decripts and then reencrypts the traffic.  Unless you&#8217;ve seen something that points otherwise.</p>

<p>Jason</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Daniel</title>
		<link>http://dmiessler.com/blog/voip-security/comment-page-1#comment-1179</link>
		<dc:creator>Daniel</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 26 Jul 2005 23:44:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dmiessler.com/archives/405#comment-1179</guid>
		<description>&lt;p&gt;The key is the end to end encryption. Capturing data does nothing for an attacker really, unless they can crack 256-bit Rijndael.&lt;/p&gt;
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The key is the end to end encryption. Capturing data does nothing for an attacker really, unless they can crack 256-bit Rijndael.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Jason Ormes</title>
		<link>http://dmiessler.com/blog/voip-security/comment-page-1#comment-1178</link>
		<dc:creator>Jason Ormes</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 26 Jul 2005 19:47:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dmiessler.com/archives/405#comment-1178</guid>
		<description>&lt;p&gt;I've been thinking about skypes security... is it possible to trace the route that the traffic takes?  how do we know theres not some intermediate stop for the traffic where its being recorded?  Do we take skype's word for it?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Jason&lt;/p&gt;
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&#8217;ve been thinking about skypes security&#8230; is it possible to trace the route that the traffic takes?  how do we know theres not some intermediate stop for the traffic where its being recorded?  Do we take skype&#8217;s word for it?</p>

<p>Jason</p>]]></content:encoded>
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